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0 Coalition Development in the Agricultural Marketing System 
“People are still very ignorant about institutions, a unified theory that accepts 
pluralism is expected.”             (Oliver E. Williamson, 2000) 
Introduction 
Within agricultural markets in the United States, new generation cooperatives are one of 
the most important new institutional innovations. In many states, agricultural producers are 
investing in relatively risky new generation cooperative ventures. Developing a theoretical 
explanation of this phenomenon is the goal of this paper. 
The investment in many closed cooperatives involves a high degree of risk. Investors 
should carefully consider the risks associated with alternative investments before making an 
investment decision. Some of the risks that cooperatives face relate to the ability of the 
cooperative to attract and retain a reliable customer base and qualified personnel, to expand the 
marketing channels, and to refine the quality and quantity of the product to meet customer needs. 
Institutions
1 like new generation cooperatives potentially have significant impacts on 
economic growth and development. The capacity of institutions to change, in response to 
changes in culture and society, resource endowments, and technology is an important 
determinant of economic progress (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984). The theme of this study is that the 
efficiency of the market for institutional innovation is a critical determinant of economic 
progress. New generation cooperatives
2 are among the most important institutional innovations 
reshaping agricultural markets in rural areas. 
                                                 
1 Institutions are seen both as rules of a society or of organizations that facilitate coordination among people by 
helping them form expectations which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others (Ruttan and Hayami, 
p.204) and unplanned and unintended regularities of social behavior that emerge from the repetitive play of games 
(Schotter, p. 118). 
2 Traditional cooperatives have struggled to acquire equity because cooperative ownership per se conveys no 
benefit. Benefits generally come only on the basis of patronage. New generation cooperatives attempt to solve the 
equity problems of traditional cooperatives by changing the property rights structure (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). 
  1Greater understanding of forces influencing new generation cooperative development 
could help existing cooperatives make changes to survive and facilitate the creation of new 
cooperatives. For agricultural economists to be in a position to provide appropriate and effective 
policy advice to groups considering new generation cooperative formation, they must first 
understand the nature of the overall cooperative formation process, including its driving forces 
and essential features. Evaluation of new generation cooperatives requires an understanding of 
factors that influence the commitment of agricultural cooperative participants to invest and be 
loyal members. 
Clearly the importance of institutional change suggests a need for theoretical models to 
analyze institutional change as well as empirical analyses. Williamson (2000) suggests that 
people are still very ignorant about institutions, and he expects a unified theory that accepts 
pluralism. Coase (1998), Williamson (2000) and Demsetz (1997) proposed the New Institutional 
Economics that promises more new ideas for the study of institutions including cooperatives. 
A very rich theoretical foundation for the analysis of institutional change can be 
developed in game theory. Schotter (1986) argued that because of the explicit treatment of rules, 
game theory is a particularly useful way of analyzing and understanding the probability of 
institution or rule evolution. Cooperative game theory remains particularly under-exploited by 
agricultural economists. The strength and capacity of cooperative game theory for application 
has been recognized by only a few agricultural economists (Horowitz, Just, and Netanyahu, 
1996). 
                                                                                                                                                             
New generation cooperatives have a more clearly defined membership policy (closed, or well defined), a secondary 
market for members’ residual claims, patronage and residual claimant status restrictions, and an enforceable member 
pre-commitment mechanism. Frequently, new generation cooperatives vertically integrate forward in the 
distribution chain. Farmers as members/owners, attempt to maintain control over their operations, reduce risk, 
stabilize income, and secure new and existing markets. New generation cooperatives can contribute as an extension 
of the farm operation that allows farmers to make decisions and have some control over the processing and 
marketing of products. 
 
  2As discussed by Togerson, Reynolds, and Gray (1997), the theory of agricultural 
cooperatives has a rich history. The development of theory of agricultural cooperatives has led to 
a greater understanding of many practical problems. For example, the Helmberger and Hoos 
model provided better understanding of the incentives to limit membership and revealed conflicts 
of interest (Torgerson, Reynolds, and Gray).  
  This paper extends the previous theory of agricultural cooperatives by integrating 
investment theory, non-monetary benefits, and fairness into a theory of cooperative development. 
Most responses to the forces inducing change involve the formation of coalitions
3 that frequently 
require financial investments and have the potential to create monetary and non-monetary 
benefits for members. New generation agricultural cooperatives are coalitions of agricultural 
producers. The theory of coalitions has been developed largely independently in the economics 
literature. Both Staatz (1983) and Sexton (1986) have used cooperative game theory to study 
agricultural cooperatives. 
Some evidence indicates that behavioral and economic decisions are driven by fairness 
considerations (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993; Akerlof, 1979; Okun, 1981; Kahneman et 
al., 1986). This literature suggests that producers’ perceptions of fairness in distribution of 
patronage refunds affects their investment decisions in new generation cooperatives. Fairness 
behavior in cooperative investment involves strategies and decisions either from the cooperative 
or investors to achieve their maximum expected utility. 
The essential difference between this paper and previous studies is that it treats the 
decision to join a closed cooperative as an investment decision and suggests that non-monetary 
payoffs may influence investment decisions. Closed cooperative investments are considered 
                                                 
3 Coalitions in agricultural marketing systems are horizontal and/or vertical groups of individuals or firms within the 
agricultural marketing system for whom a new set of binding rules or contracts are formed. 
  3within the context of a portfolio of investment choices a producer can make. A member of a 
closed cooperative receives specific rights (frequently delivery rights) in return for his/her 
investment. These rights are often transferable and may change in value. Payoffs are based on 
the amount of investment and whether the delivery obligation has been met. The value of the 
delivery right is expected to be directly related to both the size of the monetary distributions to 
the members as well as the perceived non-monetary benefits created for members. This is 
consistent with Staatz’s finding that the non-monetary benefits that some members may derive 
from belonging to a cooperative broaden the set of potentially stable solutions (Staatz 1989, 
p.20).  
The size and value of benefits of a cooperative are affected by the business environment 
and internal decisions of existing cooperatives. The benefits of a coalition are evaluated in utility 
functions that have monetary and non-monetary benefits, fairness, and risk as arguments. 
Without a clear unifying theory of coalitions in agriculture that incorporates the 
underlying non-monetary motivations and characteristics of the participants, it will be difficult 
for agricultural economists to develop appropriate hypotheses and complete appropriate 
empirical work about cooperative development. Most importantly, producers, policy makers, and 
other marketing channel participants who need solutions to marketing problems, will not have 
access to the information they need to evaluate new cooperative development. 
Consistent with Sexton (1990), producers may be motivated to participate in cooperatives 
because they understand that cooperatives alter decision-making in non-cooperative firms. In 
addition, consistent with Ladd (1974) cooperatives may also produce non-monetary benefits 
which are restricted to members and may motivate membership. 
  4In the next section we present the theoretical model of coalition formation based on the 
bargaining concept. In section II, we develop a game-theoretic model that incorporates non-
monetary benefits and investment theory into the analysis of closed cooperative investment. An 
initial investment decision analysis and the mean-variance model of agricultural marketing 
cooperative are discussed in section III. A discussion of the implications of our model in an 
agricultural cooperative settings and conclusion are presented in section IV. 
I. A Model of Coalition Formation 
A game in coalitional form specifies, for every coalition of players, a set of monetary 
payoff vectors that are feasible for players within the coalition if they agree to cooperate. We 
also specify, for each coalition, the amount of non-monetary benefits available to members. A 
player can be an agricultural firm or an individual farmer. A coalition is formed and a feasible 
monetary payoff vector is chosen only when the coalition, the payoff vector and the non-
monetary benefits are accepted by all players involved. Membership in the coalitions and the 
monetary and non-monetary payoffs to each member are the solution to the cooperative game.  
The idea of a bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler (1964); Mas-Colell (1989); Zhou 
(1994)) is used to provide a solution concept that specifies the coalition formation and payoff 
distribution. By assuming that all players in the game can bargain together with perfect 
communication, the stability of outcomes of a game depend on objections and counter objections 
to each coalition that exists. A coalition is stable if all objections can be met by counter-
objections. The set of all stable outcomes is called the bargaining set. 
Consider an n-person cooperative game  , with a given set of n players,  . 
Let  { be the non-empty subsets C of N, called the permissible coalitions. For each C,  , 
a number  is given and it is called the value of the coalition C. In the standard model of 
Φ } , , 2 , 1 { n N L =
} {C C ∈ } C
) (C v
  5coalitions,  is measured by material payoffs which are a prerequisite to coalition formation 
and stability.  Assume that all 1-person coalitions in { have a zero value, i.e., i  
and the value of the coalition C is positive,  . A payoff configuration will now 
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Thus, a payoff configuration is a representation of a possible outcomes of the game, in which the 
players divide themselves into groups, so-called coalitions, C1, C2, …, Cm, and each coalition 
distributes its value among its members, and each player receives the amount    x
  When people are faced with a game, logically, it is reasonable that one does not expect 
that a payoff configuration will occur if  , since player i alone can secure more by playing 
as a 1-person coalition with a zero value. By assuming that ∑  for each C, 
 the payoff configuration will be a coalitionally rational payoff 
configuration. Thus, the coalition rationality assumption is very strong as it forces the game to be 
essentially superadditive.
i x
≥ i C v x ) (
m j C C , , 2 , 1 , }, { L = ∈
4 Superadditivity requires that a coalition whose value is less than the 
 
4 A game is superadditive if the value of the union of two disjoint coalitions exceeds the sum of the values of each 
coalition. 
  6sum of the values of disjoint subcoalitions cannot occur in any coalitionally rational payoff 
configuration. 
  Usually, the bargaining process starts when each player tries to get at least as much as 
possible. At the same time, there is a desire for fair play. People will be happy with their 
coalition if they agree that the worthier partners will get more. Thus, during the negotiations 
prior to coalition formation, each player tries to convince his/her partners that in some sense 
she/he is worthy of high payoffs. This process can happen in various ways, among which an 
important factor is a players’ ability to show that she/he has other (perhaps better) alternatives. 
Partners, besides pointing out their own alternatives, may argue in return that even without 
his/her help they can perhaps keep their proposed shares. A negotiation is a sequence of 
objections and counter-objections. Stability is reached if all objections can be answered by 
counter-objections.
5 
  The essence of the study of cooperative formation is that producers will not join a 
cooperative unless they receive a benefit from doing so. Sexton (1986) builds the model of 
cooperative formation based on the assumptions that cooperative membership is voluntary then 
individuals decide whether to join or not to join based on profit considerations. Clearly, Sexton’s 
model is based on monetary payoffs that specifically emphasize the individual decision makers 
and their incentives to undertake joint action based upon monetary payoffs. 
II. Theoretical Model of Cooperative Investment 
An integrated model of cooperative investment based on game theory is proposed. This 
model explains coalition development, factors influencing coalition stability, and the producers’ 
                                                 
5 The formal mathematical definition of objections and counter-objections is found in Aumann and Maschler (1964, 
p.448-449).  
  7perceptions of the actual payoffs from coalition participation. Coalition structures and their 
evolution are examined.  
Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 
  We consider the process of decision making in a closed cooperative investment as a 
dynamic game between the cooperative and the investors. In order to determine the set of 
strategies for either the cooperative association or the investors, the moves the players have, the 
order in which they choose these moves, and the information they have when they make their 
decisions must be specified. One way to organize this information is through the development of 
a game tree.
6 Decision nodes in game tree are represented by boxes, which contain the identity of 
the players who move at that node. A branch represents a possible move by a player. Every 
branch connects two nodes and has a direction which is depicted by an arrowhead. 
Figure 1 displays the game tree for a dynamic closed cooperative formation and operation 
game. The game begins at the top of the game tree where cooperative association initially writes 
a prospectus for the closed cooperative. For simplicity, it is assumed the cooperative either offers 
an optimistic or conservative prospectus as shown by each branch. Each branch points to a 
decision node for the producers since producers make their investment decisions after they learn 
and evaluate the type of strategies the cooperative has adopted. From each of the two decision 
nodes extend two branches representing the two possible moves producers can make. Again the 
decision is simplified as a decision to invest or not to invest. If an insufficient number of 
producers decide to invest, a cooperative firm does not form. 
                                                 
6 A game tree is a picture composed of nodes and branches, where each node in the game tree represents a decision 
point for one of the players and is said to belong to the player that moves at that point. 
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Figure 1. The Game Tree for Dynamic Games in the Case of Closed Cooperatives
9 Units of investment give the producer delivery rights to the cooperative, and the value of 
the investment will change if conditions affecting the cooperative’s business change.  If enough 
investor capital and delivery commitments are secured, then producers deliver their inputs, and 
the company operates for the year. As the cooperative operates its business, it develops a history 
of earnings and cash patronage distributions to its members. At the cooperative’s decision nodes, 
cooperatives elect to distribute high or low cash patronage refunds. Again, to simplify the game 
tree, a continuous decision is treated as two discrete choices. 
Using the outcome for the first year, and expectations for the future, each producer can 
decide to buy more or sell (transfer) stock/delivery rights. They also decide how much to deliver 
so they can participate in next year’s patronage distribution. The sequential decision making 
process continues as long as the firm exists. 
III. A Model of Agricultural Marketing Cooperative 
An integrated model of coalition development is a model that considers major 
determinants influencing the stability of coalitions. Investment decisions and non-monetary 
benefits from the cooperative investment are incorporated into the analysis of the model of 
cooperative membership. The crucial feature of the model is how producers’ investment 
decisions and non-monetary benefits from the investment affect the stability of coalition 
structures. Another important aspect of this model is the effect of fairness on welfare allocations. 
Two important elements of fairness are the actual outcome of an action, and the expected 
outcome (reference point) from membership. 
  Fairness is formalized in the framework developed by Rabin (1993). Rabin’s model 
incorporates fairness into economic research. He modifies conventional game theory by allowing 
payoffs to depend on fairness. We assume investors are more likely to invest in a cooperative as 
10 part of their portfolio if that investment is perceived to be fair, to have relatively low risk, and to 
provide non-monetary benefits. 
Producers are presented with a prospectus for an agricultural marketing cooperative that 
will add value to the raw commodity they produce. To join this coalition, an investor must be an 
agricultural producer and produce the raw material further processed by the cooperative. 
Members are provided the rights to subscribe for and purchase shares of common stock in 
the cooperative, and also agree to deliver for the raw material to the cooperative each year. The 
cooperative association distributes one delivery right for each share of common stock held on the 
record date. Each delivery right entitles an eligible member to deliver one unit of commodity. 
For example, a member may exercise the rights to purchase minimum 1,000 shares for $5,000.  
Each year the producer has the obligation to deliver 1,000 bushels of wheat. If the cooperative is 
profitable, the ownership shares and the delivery rights will appreciate in value and surpluses 
generated by the cooperative will be distributed to the members as stock and/or cash in 
proportion to how much of the raw product (wheat) they deliver annually. The potential 
appreciation in share value and the cash patronage refund represent the monetary benefits from 
membership. 
  Unlike previous work by Sexton, we assume that investors maximize expected utility of 
the investment, and their utility function includes the expected monetary benefits from 
investment, risk, fairness, and non-monetary benefits and is maximized subject to their wealth 
constraint. Membership in a new generation cooperative is assumed to be voluntary and potential 
members choose whether to invest or not to invest a cooperative based on monetary, non-
monetary benefits, fairness, and risk. Non-monetary benefits are included because the firm is 
  11located in an area in which the producer may want to create employment opportunities and 
support economic development. 
  Investment theory and the previous work about “revealed preference” conditions for 
validity of the utility maximization model are used and extended (Varian, 1983). The mean-
variance model of cooperative investment captures the investor’s rationality in undertaking 
investment decision based on the expected return on investment, risk, fairness, and non-monetary 
return associated with the investment. The substantial difference between this model and 
Varian’s work are the non-monetary benefits and fairness terms in the investor’s utility function. 
The Mean-Variance Cooperative Portfolio Model 
 Let  (p p =  denotes for the vector of prices for the assets.   
represents the assets or portfolio choices. The variable  denotes expected return 
on the portfolio choices 1, …, A, and G represents the non-monetary benefits from 
portfolio x. The investor’s expected return for portfolio 
) , , 1 A p K ) , , ( 1 A x x x K =
) , , ( 1 A R R R K =
) , , ( 1 A G G K =
x is denoted by W ; f is a vector of 
the investors’ perception of fairness for each asset   and W  represents initial 
level of wealth. U  is the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function which is enhanced with 
non-monetary benefits, risk, and a fairness component. 
Rx =
0 ) , , ( 1 A f f K f =
) (⋅
The risks associated with cooperative investment as a part of producers’ portfolio are 
represented by variance of return on investment from the portfolio x. The variance of return from 
portfolio x is represented by  Vx x′ φ  where  0 < φ  is the risk-aversion parameter, and V is the 
variance/covariance matrix of the investment x. The investor’s utility from portfolio x has a mean 
µ and variance  . Utility is a function of expected return on investment, the variance of return 
from the portfolio, perception of fairness, and non-monetary benefits associated with that 
portfolio choice. Producers are hypothesized to maximize utility subject to a wealth constraint: 
2 σ
  12(3)       ) , , , ( max fx Gx Vx x Rx U
x
′ φ  
subject to    o W x p = ⋅
and    0 ≥ x
Definition 1. We have observed a portfolio choice  for  , a mean-variance 
utility function rationalizes the observed investor behavior if and only if 
i x n i , , 1 K =
(4)       )
)
, , , ( ) , , ' , ( fx Gx Vx x Rx U fx Gx Vx x Rx U
i i i i i ′ ≥ φ φ
for all portfolios x that cost the same or less than  . That is: . This 
expression tells us that given the expected return R, variance/covariance matrix V, non-monetary 
return vector G, and fairness vector f, investors decide to invest in the cooperative membership if 
the expected utility from a portfolio containing a cooperative investment exceeds any other 
affordable portfolio.  
i x 0 ) ( or ≤ − ≤
i i i i i x x p x p x p
There are two ways of proving that Equation 4 is true. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions for Equation 4 can be derived using either Slutsky conditions or revealed preference 
conditions (Varian, 1983). Revealed preference conditions are used because this approach is 
more applicable for empirical analysis. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the mean-
variance utility maximization of Equation 4 are described in Theorem 1. 
  Theorem 1. If we assume that the mean-variance utility function is a monotonic, 
concave, and differentiable, then we know from the standard properties of concave functions that 
for   and  ,  
i x
j x
(5)        .  )( ( ' ) ( ) (
j i j j i x x x U x U x U − + ≤ n j i , , 1 , K =
Furthermore the hypothesis of utility maximization implies that first-order conditions must be 
satisfied by the data. That is 
  13(6)         
j j j p x U λ = ) ( ' 0 and , , 1 > =
j n j λ K
For the utility function represented in Equation 4, Equation 5 and 6 are rewritten as Equation 7 
and 8. 
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j λ  marginal utility of income. 
Equation 7 is the standard requirement for utility maximization which is property of concavity 
from Equation 5, and Equation 8 is the first-order conditions of the utility function that satisfied 
the Equation 6. Given the information about  , we can show U  
 then Equation 7 holds and our mean-variance utility function is concave, 
differentiable, and monotonic. 
) , (
i i x p , 0 , 0 , 0 , < > >
i i i i S E M
0 and 0 > >
i i H λ
  Proof. Equation 7 describes the standard properties of concave functions and Equation 8 
is the usual first-order conditions of the mean-variance utility function. We assume U  exist,  ) (
i x
  14, 0 , 0 > >
i i E M
, , ( x Gx Rx U φ
). (
i i x U U =
, ( Gx Rx
(Rx
, , ( Gx Rx
   and  . That is the marginal utility of monetary returns is 
positive, the marginal utility of non-monetary benefits is also positive, the marginal utility of risk 
is negative, the marginal utility of fairness is positive, and the marginal utility of income is 
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We must show that given any x with  ,  U . In deriving the 
sufficient conditions for the mean-variance utility maximization model we need to define: 
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Since the variance-covariance matrix V is positive semi-definite, for all   we can write 
the variance of portfolio x as  . By arranging this inequality we get the 
algebraic identity .  
x x
i and
0 ) ≥ −
i i x x
) 2
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Now suppose that some x such that  . For notational convenience, let us define 
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  Rationalizing the observed behavior of investors using a differentiable, concave, 
monotonic utility function will guarantee the existence of U  
that satisfy the inequalities: U . If there exist 
some values U  that satisfy the 
inequalities above for some observed behavior of investors ( , then there must 
exist a continuous, concave, monotonic utility function that rationalizes the observed behavior. 
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Stage I: Initial Investment Decision 
  The investor’s interest is choosing   to maximize utility. Changes in  are changes in 
demand for investment. Suppose that  is chosen to maximize the investor’s utility. Let   
be the monetary returns,   be the non-monetary benefits,   be the variance of returns, 
and  represents fairness
i x
i x
i x ) (
i x µ
) (
i x D ) (





7. For example, the amount of delivery rights purchased monetary 
and non-monetary benefits, risks, and perception of fairness. Let us denote the maximum utility 
as   for different choices of  . 
i x
() ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( max ) (
2 i i i i
x
i x F x x D x U x M
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7 In initial investment decision analysis the notations   are used for derivation purposes instead of 
, to make the utility function more general. 
F D and , , ,
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  16so that the Lagrangian is 
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and the first-order conditions with respect to  and 
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These conditions determine the optimal choice of   which in turn determine the maximum 
utility function  . Since  ;  ; 
;  and   then the investment demand function, 
i x
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8 gives a formula for the derivative of maximum utility function 
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8 The proof of the envelope theorem can be found in Varian (1992) p. 502. 
  17This equation shows how the maximum utility changes, given changes in  . 
i x
Stage II: Closed Cooperative’s Decision Model 
The closed cooperative’s objective function is to maximize net surplus, and the 
cooperative surplus function is determined by revenue, total production costs, and cash patronage 
refunds. Suppose there is a coalition S of M potential investors in a closed cooperative, 
. We assume that closed cooperative (coalition S) produces consumer product, k, 
using purchased input from non-members plus input from members,  , where the marginal cost 
of producing k is c  and the total cost is  . From our derivation of the investor’s demand 
for cooperative investment we have  . Assume this is a continuous 
and differentiable for all variables in the model. 
) , , 1 ( m M K =
k z
) ( k z ) ( k z C
, , ( G R




The aggregate demand for cooperative investment from the cooperative members in 
coalition S,  
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where   is equivalent to owners equity which is determined by Equation 21 in Stage I. Total 
investment capital,  , can be obtained from owners equity and/or loans. Let   is the amount 
of investment capital to produce consumer product k from loans that is proportional to amount of 
capital invested/owners equity in the cooperative,   where 
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S x
k K k L
) (
* i
S k x L γ = γ  is the loan leverage 
parameter. The cooperative investment capital is    .  = )
* i
S x + = (
* i
S k x K γ
* i
S x ) γ + 1 (
Let ) , ( k k j K z θ be the revenue that an investor obtains from an investment in a closed 
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, then cooperative’s revenue can be written as  , where 
 is the price of consumer product k. The cooperative’s surplus is: 
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where C is the total production costs associated with producing k and  is the price 
for one unit of raw material/input. If   is the optimum quantity of input that maximizes 
, then we will get   if 
* = k z ) ( ) , ( k k k S z C K z ≤  for all  .  
The cooperative’s retained earnings (RE) are:  
(23)             for    ) ( ) , ( , ( k S k k k z R K z z − ′ ′
where   is the cash patronage refunds which can be earned by investors in 
coalition S with   as the book value of each share of common stock at the present time. We can 
express the cooperative’s retained earnings, RE:  
(24)         ), , ( max[ ) k k K z RE Π ′′ =
The cooperative’s retained earnings   if cooperatives are not profitable to deliver 
to investors or if not enough capital and delivery commitments. In either case, the 
cooperative fails to operate. 
0 ) , = k k K z
To formally derive the cooperative maximizing behavior, Equation 24 may be rewritten 
as an optimization problem: 
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k
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k
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9 The investment capital,  , is a constant term which determined and fixed from Stage I of closed cooperative 
investment game tree. We assume that the cost of owner equity and loans are fixed. 
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where E is the maximum amount of shares allowable to be offered by the cooperative, and  is 
the initial book value of each share of common stock (one share is equivalent to one unit of input 
delivered). 
r w
The Lagrangian function is  
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By assuming that  is differentiable then the first-order and the second-order conditions 
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then we get competitive factor demand,  
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so the solution for the supply function maximizing the cooperative net surplus is 
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The Role of Fairness 
Suppose there is a two-player cooperative game with perfect information. The two 
players are the cooperative and an investor. The mixed strategy sets are T and T  for the 
investors and the cooperative, respectively. Let   be the investor’s expected return of 
M C
M
i x R ) ( ⋅
  20portfolio choice  . We assume that maximization of each player’s expected utility is 
determined by their chosen strategy and their beliefs about the other player’s strategy choices. 
Let a  and   be the strategies chosen by the investor and the cooperative, 
respectively. The investor’s beliefs about the strategy the cooperative is choosing is represented 
by  , and the cooperative’s beliefs about what strategy the investor is choosing is 
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The fairness term f measures how fair an investor perceives the treatment of other players 
(cooperative) in the coalition. To formalize the investor’s perceptions, it is necessary to develop 
a model that explicitly incorporates beliefs. The term   explains how fair the 
cooperative is being by choosing strategy  . If the cooperative believes that the investor is 
choosing strategy b . The term   measures how much more than or less than 
investor’s equitable payoff, the cooperative believes the association is giving to the investor. The 
cooperative has the opportunity to choose the payoff pair [  from among 
the set of all feasible payoffs if the investor is choosing strategy  . The investor’s equitable 
payoff is expressed by the following relationship     
provides a reference point against which to measure how fair the cooperative is perceived as 
being to the investor, where   is the investor’s highest payoff in   and   is 
the investor’s lowest payoff among points that are Pareto-efficient
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10 in   The feasible set 
of Pareto-efficient points are the points in the set   
where   is the set of alternative payoff combinations   and  ; and T  is the set of pure 
 
10 Pareto-efficient is a point in which it is not possible to make one person better off without making at least one 
other person worse off. The pareto-efficient situation always reflects optimal point in the set of feasible points. 
  21strategies of the cooperative. The term   looks at the set of payoff combinations from the 
cooperative’s perspective, and the cooperative takes into account its belief about which strategy 
the investor will choose  . Accordingly,   reflects the cooperative’s belief about all 
players’ payoff combinations in the opportunity set. 
) ( M b X

















From these payoffs, the fairness term is defined. This term captures how much more than 
or less than investor’s equitable payoff the cooperative believes the association is giving to 
investor. 
Definition 2. The perception about the cooperative’s fairness to the investor is given by 
















If   then all of the cooperative’s responses to strategy b  provide investor 
the same payoff. Therefore, there is no fairness issue and  . Clearly, 
if and only if the cooperative gives the investor the equitable payoff. If 
 the cooperative is giving the investor less than the equitable payoff. Finally, if 
 the cooperative is giving the investor more than the equitable payoff. The 
investor’s fairness to the cooperative is given by  . If the investor believes that the 
cooperative is choosing strategy   then the term   measures how fair the investors 
are being to the coopertative. Figure 2 shows the outcome term  as a function of the 
level of payoff ( ’s). This figure captures the producer’s perception of fairness: the higher the 
investor’s payoff offered by the cooperative is compared to the equitable payoff, the higher the 
perception of fairness. 
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Figure 2: The Outcome Term as a Function of the Level of Payoff Offered for a Given 
Motivation Factor
23 The central feature of this fairness term is that if investors believe that the cooperative is 
treating them unfairly, then , and the investor wishes to respond to the cooperative 
negatively by choosing strategy   such that  . However, if cooperative is 
delivering fair action to investors,  , and then investors will provide the 
cooperative fair feedback. 
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Hypotheses 
This theory of cooperative investment shows that the cooperative enterprises that 
generate maximum expected utility to producers are preferred more than those that do not. 
Joining a closed cooperative may increase the investor’s risk, especially if it is a start-up 
enterprise. There must be a meaningful reason that encourages investors to invest in a closed 
cooperative. Equation 19 in the previous section clearly generates three hypotheses related to the 
closed cooperative investment decisions. The first question to be addressed in this analysis then 
is whether non-monetary benefits from cooperative investment motivate producers to invest in a 
closed cooperative. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
1 H : Producers who want to create employment opportunities and support economic development 
in their local community are more willing to invest in a cooperative as part of their portfolio if 
that investment provides those non-monetary benefits. 
The impact of risks associated with cooperative investment on producer’s expected utility 
and investment decisions is an important issue in this study. The second hypothesis is: 
2 H : Risk-averse producers are more willing to invest in a closed cooperative if they perceive 
that investment to have relatively low risk. 
  The third hypothesis is related to the psychological literature that eventually was used to 
study the implications of fairness in economic transactions. Evidence indicates that people’s 
24 notions of fairness are heavily influenced by the status quo and other reference points (Rabin, 
1993; Kahneman et al., 1986a, b). Following this reasoning, the third hypothesis is: 
3 H : Producers who are concerned about fairness are more willing to invest in a closed 
cooperative if that enterprise provides treatment that is perceived as fair. 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
The forces inducing change in agricultural cooperative institutions have lead to the 
demand for a clear unifying theory of agricultural marketing cooperative development. A model 
of new generation cooperative investment based on investment theory is proposed by 
incorporating monetary, non-monetary, fairness, and risk components in the model. Our model 
incorporates non-monetary perception of the investors as an essential determinant influencing the 
formation of a cooperative. Investors judging whether or not to invest in a new generation 
cooperative not only consider monetary benefits from their investment but non-monetary 
benefits, fairness and risk as well. 
Our theory suggests that the rational investor will choose a new generation cooperative as 
part of his portfolio if the utility of a new generation cooperative investment exceeds any other 
affordable portfolio. 
  The role of fairness in the new generation cooperative investment model captures several 
important issues of investor behavior. Investors’ perception of fairness is heavily influenced by 
their reference points. For instance, the investors’ view of the fairness of closed cooperative’ 
management to the members can be influenced by how that firm has treated them in the past 
relative to their expectation. 
The model of closed cooperative investment can be viewed from a game theoretical 
approach as a sequential game with perfect information. In the cooperative formation stage, the 
  25potential investors observe the cooperative’s management behavior, and this provides 
information on which investors make their investment decisions. In this game, the cooperative’s 
management behavior can conceivably change the motivation of the investor to invest. A 
sequential game involves sequential strategies and a decisions process, and it will continue as 
long as the firm exists. 
In the earlier stage, the success of a coalition formation is greatly determined by the 
prospectus of that cooperative. If the cooperative’s prospectus provides overly optimistic 
investment return expectations, initial positive perceptions may be created. In the second stage of 
the game, the investors have two alternative strategies: increase or decrease the investment for 
the next period of the operation. The decision is determined by utility as a member of the closed 
cooperative. If the cooperative delivers high utility to its members, again the investors will 
respond positively to the cooperative’s management and increase their investment. Investors 
maximize utility subject to a wealth constraint and they will decide to invest in the cooperative if 
the expected utility from a portfolio containing a cooperative investment exceeds any other 
affordable portfolio. Sequentially, the cooperative maximizes net surplus subject to maximum 
allowable shares to be offered to investors. 
The initial investment decision analysis provides the optimal value of demand for a 
closed cooperative investment in achieving maximum utility as a function of monetary return, 
social/non-monetary benefits, variance of the return, and fairness. The stage II analysis obtains 
and derives the supply function of the closed cooperative investment. Further research is 
obviously required, since comprehensive analysis with respect to the closed cooperative point of 
view needs to be developed. 
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